LISTENING TO LOCAL VOICES REQUIRES COMING CLOSER.
The Sahel region is in flux. It has witnessed political instability and security challenges with coups and conflicts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sudan. The disruption of security arrangements and the closure of civil society spaces pose significant challenges. How can civil society work in this volatile environment? And what, if anything, can large donor bodies like the European Union do to help?
Over the past three years, the Sahel region has experienced a series of political upheavals and security challenges. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, three elected governments were removed from power in 2020, 2022, and 2023 respectively. Additionally, there were two more coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. The death of the autocrat Idriss Déby Itno of Chad in battle also added to the instability. As a result, existing security arrangements, including the G5 Sahel Force comprising these four countries plus Mauritania, were disrupted.
Currently, there is a full-blown war happening in Sudan, leading to an enduring refugee crisis in Chad, Algeria, and Mauritania. The entire Sahel region is experiencing a surge in terrorist activity, while two military governments have requested the deployment of foreign mercenaries. Moreover, the space for civil society activity has been closed down. In light of these circumstances, one may wonder if any useful measures can be taken to address the situation.
Representatives of peacebuilding civil society organisations and groups that wish to promote good governance are simultaneously realistic and optimistic. ‘It’s not easy,’ says Roger Minoungou. He runs the Sahel Project from Ouagadougou in his country, Burkina Faso. ‘We have serious issues, as some areas of the country have become inaccessible. On the other hand, state actions have resulted in some trunk roads being freed and reopened.’
Away from the capital, in the northern town of Ouahigouya, the circumstances are similar. Kadiatou Ouédraogo runs the Association feminine pour le développement du Burkina Faso (AFEDEB), established in 2000 to fight against gender-based violence. She notes: ‘The security situation has meant that we no longer have access to certain localities. Inhabitants from several nearby villages have moved into town and developed a resilience that permits them to continue with their lives.
Shrinking Civil Space
‘This includes ensuring access to sufficient food through international humanitarian interventions, which focus on providing emergency assistance, while also supporting income-generating activities to prepare individuals for their eventual return to their communities.’ As some areas are becoming physically accessible again, the expression space for civil society is decreasing. Military governments throughout the region refuse to engage in dialogue with those they consider ‘terrorists,’ complicating the process of reconciliation for peace-builders.
Following the coup in Niger, similar assessments have been made there as well. Boubacar Illiasou is project manager at the prominent pro-transparency body ROTAB (Réseau des organisations pour la transparance et analyse budgetaire). ROTAB has also been collecting data on victims of violence in the very troubled Tilaberi and Tahoua regions near the Malian border. ‘Security is a major problem for those who record what has been done to these communities; acts like murder and theft,’ he says. ‘They are threatened by the state security forces and non-state armed groups who look very unfavourably on this work. They see data collectors as the enemy.’
Throughout the Sahel, reporting from areas declared military zones has been rendered virtually impossible, as these have been formally or effectively declared off-limits for independent journalists and researchers. In many ways, this is a continuation of existing policies. Before the first coup in Burkina Faso, its parliament had already adopted a gag law in June 2019, banning reporting from conflict zones.
However, Iliasou points out that the international response to the coup in his country in July this year has caused another problem. ‘We are facing difficulties as a result of the sanctions put in place against Niger after the coup, especially by regional organisations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). ‘We face challenges in obtaining funds needed to carry out our work. As you may have noticed during our conversation, we have to deal with frequent power cuts that can occur at any moment. This is because our neighbour to the north, Nigeria, has reduced most of our electricity supply.’
Something similar is happening to relations with the European Union. ‘We have great relations with the EU. However, those have now been suspended following the coup, which is regrettable.’ The new EU Strategy for the Sahel, adopted in April 2021 by the Council of the European Union (The Council), focuses on governance issues, security sector reform, and human rights. It provides scope for working with civil society organisations and local governments.
Shift in Strategy
All this should serve the EU in its efforts to help bring about stability and security in the Sahel. It is a departure from the previous approach, adopted ten years earlier, which was built around combating terrorism through military means. It is an interesting step towards a different and hopefully more successful approach. A 2021 briefing written for the European Parliament about the new strategy notes that the previous approach did not bring the expected success. One of the roads to success for this new strategy is through a more proactive approach to engaging civil society.
Hans Rouw, who leads the Protection of Civilians programme at PAX, believes practical steps are needed to make this happen. ‘The ambition is there, but tangible arrangements are yet to be made. Is there someone available to talk to civil society representatives in Brussels or locally?’ Rouw wants another aspect addressed. ‘What is the EU able to contribute in attempts to make states more accountable to the citizens? What you find so often in the Sahel is that there is no social contract between the state and the citizens. Can outsiders understand this situation and help improve it?’
Perhaps the real question is whether the EU is equipped to bring about this kind of rapprochement between the state and the people it governs. Whatever the case, the Sahel context, more than anything, requires a holistic approach that takes into account the views and ideas of the communities that have been directly hit by violence, from whichever side it came. It is a point that civil society representatives in the Sahel have been making repeatedly.
As Boubacar Illiassou already mentioned, there have been successful cooperation efforts between EU representatives and civil society based on good personal relations. But as a Round Table meeting in Ouagadougou in September 2022 revealed, there are no structural ties between the EU’s growing efforts in the Sahel and civil society organisations in the region. No mechanism exists to ensure views and visions of civil society find their way to the circles of decision-makers in Brussels or the capitals of the EU member states—and that is regrettable.
It is important to involve civil society organisations in all the main policy areas identified in the new strategy, including governance and human rights, security and the rule of law, politics and diplomacy, and the fight against radicalisation and extremist violence. Their input can greatly benefit all these interventions. As Kadiatou Ouédraogo asserts: ‘There exist ways in which civil society already makes contributions at the national level here in Burkina Faso. There are communication channels available; citizens use radio, television, and social media. We have structures for public hearings, fora, and the likes, as frameworks for exchange and discussion.’
All the EU needs to do is open its doors to those existing structures and mechanisms and become part of the conversation. ‘You cannot make analyses from a distance.’ That is the way Roger Minoungou puts it. There is a great willingness to share experiences gained from the work civil society organisations have done on the ground and the insights collected. ‘To arrive at a good conflict analysis, you will need the views of the communities. You must listen to them. What we now have are isolated projects.’ This would, for instance, require being familiar with the fact that the worst affected areas also tend to be the ones that have been the most marginalised economically and in terms of development.
A Holistic Approach
And here we arrive again at the same point: the need for a holistic approach to which civil society organisations can contribute greatly. A lot of experience has been gained, not only in collecting data, as has been done in Niger and Burkina Faso. Minoungou adds: ‘We have experience in conflict prevention and de-radicalisation. We bring together traditional leaders, religious leaders, women, and youth for dialogue to discuss issues and advance solutions, such as improving access to justice. We have managed to maintain good contacts with authorities like the Ministry of Justice. This is how we add value.’ The EU Delegation holds office in a building behind a high wall in central Ouagadougou, where Minoungou highlights this when he meets with EU representatives.
PAX is busy repositioning itself in this fast-moving political, geopolitical, and security landscape called the Sahel. Its presence is readily appreciated, as Kadiatou Ouédraogo confirms: ‘We find the theory of change PAX employs quite effective. It permits the identification of the problems that communities experience in various parts of the country. Involving members of our communities in problem analysis enables PAX to become familiar with what is ailing these communities at a deeper level.’
What she specifically has in mind is the fight against radicalisation, also mentioned by Minoungou. ‘PAX have been helpful in that respect, while we were realising our projects for de-radicalisation.’ Meanwhile, the hardening of the juntas’ positions has complicated matters, especially after Kidal, the de facto Tuareg rebel capital in north-eastern Mali, was captured in November. It will only embolden the juntas to opt for the purely military approach, a direction the EU is trying to leave behind. Overall, the absence of Mali from current civil society-driven peacebuilding efforts is keenly felt.
After all, the Sahel conflict originated there, and developments in Mali are key to the entire region. Be that as it may, the focus for now is on sharing experiences within the existing PAX network. A regional meeting was held to this effect in early December in Ouagadougou. Participants from six countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire) focussed on reinforcing the collaboration among civil society actors in West Africa.
New Alliances
Other themes include more and better engagement with the European Union. Hans Rouw reiterates: ‘We would like to see the EU play a more prominent role, taking into account the more all-encompassing approach it seeks.’ The participants at the Ouagadougou meeting were also keen to engage with the regional body ECOWAS, which has an elaborate counter-terrorism strategy and is preparing a standby force to intervene, when and where necessary. This potentially opens yet another diplomatic can of worms, as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have formed a parallel alliance called AES (Alliance des états sahéliens), which is not recognised by ECOWAS.
Because things are moving so fast, the risks are that structures serving as bases for policymaking cease to exist before the policy papers are printed. The EU’s Sahel strategy leans on the concept of the G5 Sahel, a random grouping of one Maghreb country (Mauritania), one member of the Economic Community of Central African States (Chad) and three ECOWAS member states (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), now run by military juntas. Mali blew up this grouping by withdrawing in May 2022 while Burkina Faso and Niger left in the first week of December. The two remaining members formally buried the organisation on the 6th of December.
Illiassou argues that it is precisely in these states of flux that intervention can work better. ‘The post-coup period can be seen as an opportunity for actors like the EU to use their local and international relations to leverage change. Use existing ties with civil society organisations to lobby for a better democracy. Now is the time for a real debate.’ ROTAB members in Niger—including Illiassou—found themselves regularly arrested and inhumanely treated by police when they were exposing corruption or human rights violations by the previous governments that outsiders characterised as ‘democratic’. Similar to Burkina Faso with its gag laws and Mali with its excessively high levels of corruption, these all happened during the reign of elected presidents. Few want that type of political class back in power. They want something better, and now is the time to work towards that aim.
Pressure from the European Parliament shifted Europe’s security strategy away from the military and towards human rights, governance, access to justice and the like. Similar shifts may occur regarding migration, which the EU declares ‘central to EU foreign policy in the region’ but which nobody on the ground in the region identifies as a problem. Common ground is found in the notion that a stable and relatively prosperous Sahel will certainly be beneficial for the continents on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. The last decade has been a nightmare for the people living in the Sahel. They shouldn’t have to endure another one.
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